This document defines a Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) that prevents protocol downgrade attacks on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. It updates RFC 2246, RFC 4346, and RFC 5246.
Introduction
To work around interoperability problems with legacy servers, many TLS client implementations do not rely on the TLS protocol version negotiation mechanism alone, but will intentionally reconnect using a downgraded protocol if initial handshake attempts fail. Such clients may fall back to connections in which they announce a version as low as TLS 1.0 (or even its predecessor, SSL 3.0) as the highest supported version.
While such protocol downgrades can be a useful last resort for connections to actual legacy servers, there's a risk that active attackers could exploit the downgrade strategy to weaken the cryptographic security of connections. Also, handshake errors due to network glitches could similarly be misinterpreted as interaction with a legacy server and result in a protocol downgrade.
All unnecessary protocol downgrades are undesirable (e.g., from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.1 if both the client and the server actually do support TLS 1.2); they can be particularly critical if they mean losing the TLS extension feature (when downgrading to SSL 3.0). This document defines a Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) that can be employed to prevent unintended protocol downgrades between clients and servers that comply to this document, by having the client indicate that the current connection attempt is merely a fallback.
This specification applies to implementations of TLS 1.0 [RFC2246], TLS 1.1 [RFC4346] , and TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] . (It is particularly relevant if such implementations also include support for predecessor protocol SSL 3.0 [RFC6101].) It can be applied similarly to later protocol versions.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Moeller & Langley
Expires o If TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV appears in ClientHello.cipher_suites and the highest protocol version supported by the server is higher than the version indicated in ClientHello.client_version, the server MUST respond with an inappropriate_fallback alert.
Otherwise (either TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV does not appear, or it appears and the client's protocol version is at least the highest protocol version supported by the server), the server proceeds with the handshake as usual.
Moeller & Langley Expires December 3, 2014 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft TLS Fallback SCSV June 2014
Client behavior
The TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV cipher suite value is meant for use by clients that repeat a connection attempt with a downgraded protocol in order to avoid interoperability problems with legacy servers. This section specifies when to send it.
o If a client sends a ClientHello.client_version containing a lower value than the latest (highest-valued) version supported by the client, it SHOULD include the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV cipher suite value in ClientHello.cipher_suites. (Since the cipher suite list in the ClientHello is ordered by preference, with the client's favorite choice first, signaling cipher suite values will generally appear after all cipher suites that the client actually intends to negotiate.)
However, as an exception to the above, when the client intends to perform an abbreviated handshake to resume a previously negotiated session and sets ClientHello.client_version to the protocol version negotiated for that session, the client MUST NOT include TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in ClientHello.cipher_suites.
Note that in the above, a protocol version is not considered supported by the client if it has been disabled by any applicable system or user settings: it is about the highest protocol version that the client would attempt using in a handshake, not about the highest protocol version implemented if its use is not actually enabled. 
